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ABSTRACT 
This paper concerns the set of issues surrounding the 
imposition in south India of a Permanent Settlement in 1803 for the 
local "nobility" -- the "ancient zamindars and polygars." I focus 
here on the "little kings" themselves, their transformation into 
"landlords", and the implications of the new political economy for the 
old political logic in which law, property, and the state were linked 
in very different ways. I look in particular at the problems 
concerning "alienation" under the Permanent Settlement, the fact that 
landlords, in contravention of the principles of profit and 
management, continued to make gifts of land. I conclude by examining 
the implications of my narratives for a consideration of colonial 
state and society, with respect in particular to the praxis of culture 
and the discourse of law. I demonstrate that all colonial 
transformations were, for inherent structural reasons, incompletely 
realized. 
FROM LITTLE KING TO LANDLORD: PROPERTY , 
LAW, AND THE GIFT UNDER THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT* 
Nicholas B. Dirks 
Introduction: The Moral Economy of the Precolonial Statel 
All discussions of colonialism and change presuppose certain 
understandings about the nature of precolonial society. Recently, 
Indian historians have begun to appropriate a different, but still 
relatively confined and predictable, set of characterizations of 
precolonial society for the purposes of considering different aspects 
of colonialism. Historians who concern themselves with economic 
processes such as protoindustrialization tend to minimize the impact 
. . . . 2 
of the consolidat~on of colon~al rule ~n the late e~ghteenth century. 
Changes viewed as significant by these historians usually begin with 
the introduction of capitalism and the early encroachment of one form 
or another of a world system, both of which predate the full political 
realization of colonialism. Historians who concern themselves with 
political changes tend in the other direction, although some of this 
group have proposed major continuities between the "ancien regime" and 
the early colonial state. 3 Historians concerned with social change 
view colonialism as significant but invoke various new forms of 
"dualism" to account for the limited effects of colonialism on local 
social forms. 4 But all of these historians see, or at least say they 
see, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as crucial for viewing 
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later changes in economy, polity, and society. From varying 
theoretical and ideological perspectives, they delight in excoriating 
traditional views of India as static and "traditional" before the 
arrival of the British. S 
My view of precolonial India derives from work I have done on 
a set of little kingdoms in the dryland regions of southern India. 
Since I have centered my research in the precolonial period, I too am 
one of the historians who is critical of those who write, or assume, 
that India had no real history before the British, although I differ 
from some of these historians in that I do not see history as being 
defined either by Western notions of historical consciousness or by 
the introduction of such demystifying objects as money or commerce. 6 
Nonetheless, my perspective -- both that from the little kingdom and 
from a strong concern with culture -- accentuates my sense of major 
differences between the precolonial and colonial periods, particularly 
since I see social forms as vitally linked to political structures. 
However limited, my perspective does permit some insight into the 
radical implications of certain changes brought about by British 
colonialism as well as into the resistance to particular forms of 
change by the major actors of the precolonial political system. 
I will argue here that not only were changes under colonialism 
in the realm of law and property major, but that the reasons for the 
incomplete realization of change had in part to do with the strong 
role of culture, by which I mean here the ideological realization of 
the political structure, in making certain changes both unfamiliar and 
unpalatable. However, I do not wish to hearken back to some form of 
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modernization theory, which is increasingly, and deservedly, out of 
fashion. For I will also submit that change under colonialism was 
limited by the set of purposes which lay behind, as well as the 
functions which attached themselves to, many of the innovations of 
colonial rule. Colonial change was limited as well by the set of 
colonial understandings which, as much as they involved the 
fundamental reordering of epistemic constructions of social reality, 
also led to the paradoxical attempt to freeze the sheep in wolf's 
clothing. 
This paper concerns the set of issues surrounding the 
imposition in south India of a Permanent Settlement in 1803 for the 
local "nobility" the "ancient zamindars and polygars." Fundamental 
to the Permanent Settlement were particular notions of property and 
law. Before considering the ideological base and institutional 
procedures of the introduction of these new ordering principles, we 
must consider, though in this paper very briefly, the nature of 
property in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Later on, I 
will discuss the contrast between the way in which law was 
conceptualized and operationalized in the precolonial and colonial 
periods. In recent years, Indianists have convincingly shown that 
land as something which was "owned," "possessed," or even "controlled" 
meant something very different before and after the British arrived on 
Indian soil and set out to determine "property" rights in order to 
assess and collect revenue. 7 Nonetheless, much discussion about the 
nature of pre-British property continues to be shaped by the same 
colonial sociology which was constructed with the land systems of 
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British India. The British were concerned about property partly 
because they perceived it as the fundamental means by which they would 
order Indian agrarian society and because they wanted to establish an 
ideologically coherent and functionally systematic basis for revenue 
collection. And, in our historiography revenue has been seen both as 
the principal modality of agrarian relations within villages and as 
the basic function, and agrarian concern, of the state: as revenue 
extraction. 
The problem with this preoccupation with revenue, let alone 
with the more traditional obsession with the question of who owned the 
land, is that property existed in terms of social and political 
relations. At the risk of some simplification, I will suggest here 
that the two terms used for property in Tamil suggest the somewhat 
different but interdependent nature of these social and political 
relations. 8 Panku, a term meaning share and often used to 
characterize the shares of rights to the usufruct as well as 
hereditibility of land, is fundamentally a horizontal term. Shares of 
land were shares among a group, of family members, holders of miraci 
right, of Brahmans all granted lands together under the terms of a 
single brahmadeyam grant, and even in more extended senses of members 
of an entire village. These pankus were sometimes related to 
particular plots of land and sometimes to a particular proportion of a 
larger unit of land, proportions which would be redistributed and 
reallocated periodically. Pankus in land were related to pankus in a 
variety of other contexts: shares in local temple festivals, and 
shares in kinship units (in which, for example, members of the same 
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lineage were called panka~is). The second term is k~. Meaning a 
hereditible right, the term suggests a vertical relation, since 
entitlement to a share was usually seen to have been granted by a 
superior agent. This agent was often a king, or the agent of a king, 
although in certain cases it could have been the chief of a previously 
resident dominant caste group. To have this entitlement, or ka~i, was 
to have ka~iyacci, which was related both to control over land and to 
participation in the village/lineage assembly and also, as was the 
case with panku, with rights to a share in local temple honors. 
There is one more term which must be examined in this brief 
discussion of concepts of property in pre-British India. The king who 
gives land is the overlord of all the land in his kingdom. The term 
which suggests the nature of the king's mastery over land perhaps 
better than any other is k~atra. According to Robert Lingat: 9 
Ksatra • is a power of a territorial character, exercised 
within a given territory and stopping at the frontier of the 
realm. • Of the same nature as property, it implies a direct 
power over the soil. That is why the king is also called svamin, 
a word which can be applied equally to a proprietor as to a 
husband or a chief, and which denotes an immediate power over a 
thing or over a person. 
The king's mastery of the land is not opposed to the panku and ka~i 
rights in land held by peasant cultivators, but rather exists in 
complementary relation to these rights. We have seen through our 
analysis of ka~i how entitlement to land is seen to be conferred by a 
higher agency, preferably a king. When the British attempted to sort 
out who owned the land, they assumed that the answer would be either 
the cultivator or the king, thus raising many of the classificatory 
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problema tics of the land systems debates in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. 
In the dry land regions of southern India, most land rights 
were seen as having been granted in one form or another by a king. 
Kaniyaaci rights and lands were granted by kings to local lineage 
heads, called na~;ampalams or nattanmaikarars, and later dubbed 
miracidars under the influence of late eighteenth century patrimonial 
terminology. Other land rights and privileges were granted to 
military chiefs, retainers, temples, brahmans, village officers, 
priests, servants, and artisans. Rights to land were granted along 
with other types of rights, as seen here, for landholding was not an 
isolated economic fact. Landholding, rather, was part of a system of 
privilege in which rights to exercise local authority, use certain 
titles, carry certain emblems, and receive temple honors (from temples 
which ritually symbolized local territorial and social unities) were 
part of the same package of rights as rights to "enjoy" land. 
Landholding also indicated a great deal about one's participation in 
local communities, as has been generally acknowledged by historians 
who have noted that even when there was a "free" market in land well 
into the colonial period such land was often not, or at least not 
readily, purchasable by people from outside the local community.lO 
Thus, land must not only be viewed in concert with many other things, 
such as emblems and honors, but the significance of land must be seen 
as constituted in relational terms, of both a horizontal and vertical 
nature. 
7 
Gifts of rights to land, titles, emblems and honors by kings 
to a variety of subjects became in cultural terms the dynamic medium 
f h .. f 1·· 1 1· 11 or t e const1tut10n 0 po 1t1ca re at1ons. These gifts 
symbolically, morally, and politically linked individuals with the 
sovereignty of the king and created both a moral unity and a political 
hierarchy. These ritual gifts were not mere tokens, nor were they 
signs of political weakness. In many of the smaller states in Tamil 
Natu in the eighteenth century, between sixty and eighty percent of 
all cultivable land was given away to the types of persons and 
institutions mentioned above. Over all, lands were given away in both 
central and peripheral areas of the state, although military grants 
did tend to correspond with strategic borders. The acceptance of 
gifts, which to a very large extent reflected a complicated set of 
categorizations and gradations of kinship relations, entailed loyalty 
and service. It is commonsensical to note that in the dry land 
regions of souther~ India in the eighteenth century, with vast 
portions of scrub jungle still uncultivated, control over men was more 
important than control over land, since control over men was in effect 
control over land. But it is wrong to think too exclusively in 
functionalist terms about the grants, since such analysis depends 
solely on our exogenous notions of what is and what is not functional. 
Such analysis is also limited, since function, purpose, and meaning 
are all distinct frames of reference. The point here is that the king 
ruled by making gifts. These gifts were the fundamental signs of 
sovereignty, which while it (continually) emanated from the center, 
was distributed and displayed at every level within the kingdom. 
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Without the continuance of gifts, therefore, there could be no 
sovereignty. And it was sovereignty, above all, that the little 
kings, when converted into zamindars and princes, continued to seek. 
From Moral to Political Economy 
When the British consolidated their position in south India in 
the late eighteenth century, they immediately began to introduce a 
political economy in which relations among Indians and between them 
and the new colonial government would be regulated by law and 
property. Most of the little kings who had survived the eighteenth 
century and were not deemed subversive by the British were 
"permanently" settled as zamindars on proprietary estates. Political 
relations were rechanneled into the new domain of proprietary law. If 
the zamindar defaulted on his fixed yearly payment, the estate would 
be put up for auction. As long as the terms of the property right 
were upheld, the zamindar's position was secure. Whoever held the 
title, by virtue of transfer by heredity, sale, or gift, was the 
zamindar. The drafters of the Permanent Settlement were convinced 
that a series of consequences would flow from this single 
transformation. The principal change, they thought, would be the 
redirection of the interests and energies of the little kings from 
issues of local state, warfare, and intrigue, to tasks of agrarian 
management and investment. In short, the zamindars were to become the 
rural gentry, sources both of local stability and a steady flow of 
revenue. 
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The story of how it did not work out that way is well known. 
Many of the estates went immediately into arrears. The energies of 
the zamindars went into diverse avenues of local intrigue and were 
spent in running up debts, litigating in courts over succession and 
other issues of property and office, and alienating increasing amounts 
of land from the local tax base. Perhaps it is no surprise that those 
historical studies which have been done about the zamindars stress 
only their incompetence and corruption in the face of British 
administrative concerns about management. This historiography shares 
the expection of the Permanent Settlement that the opportunity of 
security would be greeted by local investment and the subsequent 
generation of a group of landed capitalists.12 This expectation was 
miserably unfulfilled. Indeed, not only did the fixed revenue demand 
fail to stimulate the pursuit of profit, it proved a source of major 
difficulty in the years when rainfall was insufficient for a good 
harvest. Curiously, the prohibition of remissions in the Permanent 
Settlement (as well as in other land settlements) proved even more 
difficult in many cases than the considerable increase in the tax 
assessment on estates, thus bearing out the suggestions of James Scott 
that it was precisely the fixed aspect of colonial taxation that was 
most problematic. I3 In south India remissions had always been the 
rule rather than the exception, and almost all of our notions of 
precolonial taxes derive from epigraphical references to particular 
remissions, of which there were many. 
The enfranchisement of the tax free lands, called i~ams, which 
had been given by Indian kings to a variety of subjects, paralleled 
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the proprietary assumptions of the Permanent Settlement for zamindars. 
The introduction of "property" was justified by noting that it would 
only be by releasing peasants from the customary bonds of their social 
relations and by making land valuable through the creation of a market 
in land that agrarian progress could be made. As was written in the 
Government Order which set into motion the Inam Settlement throughout 
Madras Presidency:14 
The institution of private property lies at the foundation of 
human society, and the progress of improvement is generally 
commensurate with the respect in which the rights of property are 
held by the Government and the community. In this instance, an 
enormous mass of property, situated in every part of British 
India, has been kept for a long period of time in a state of 
unsettlement. Its precariousness, under the various and 
uncertain conditions of resumption, has been so much, that for 
many years it has had the character of property only in the 
lowest and most qualified sense. The loss of productive power 
which has been caused by this is incalculable. It is a great 
mistake to suppose that the owners are the only sufferers. The 
community at large is injured in nearly an equal degree by the 
absence of those improvements, and still more of that contentment 
which are the result of a secure state of landed property. 
Thus we read here virtually a credo for British rule. The 
introduction of private property rights would advance the Indian 
countryside from a state of feudal slumber a slumber which was both 
unproductive and by implication a cause of general discontent -- to 
one of capitalist vigor. The problem was that property as we 
characterized it in the pre-British period was "precarious" and 
"unsettled." Whether this property was in fact regularly resumed, 
except in cases of disloyalty or outright war, was not something the 
British set out to prove, although the theory of resumption was 
crucial for their own intention to resume tax free land and convert it 
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into taxable but secure "property." What the British were responding 
to was the relational character of property, which made it property 
only in the "lowest and most qualified sense" of the term. The 
British saw the need to replace the relational context of landholding 
not only because it made no sense to them, but because it was 
dependent on the continuance of pre-British political forms. It was 
also not without significance that it was estimated that "upwards of a 
million sterling of annual revenue" stood to be gained by 
enfranchising the illams. And, while the British knew what was 
ultimately best for the agrarian community, they also realized that 
there would be some resistance to the settlement, an initial inability 
for some at least to recognize the contentment which property was sure 
b · 1 . h· 15 to r~ng a ong w~t ~t. 
For both the little kings and for the local big men who 
derived their position, privileges, and rights from the little kings 
of old, the nineteenth century was a period during which the moral 
economy of the pre-British period had come unhinged from its full 
infrastructural underpinnings, but nonetheless remained strong enough 
in cultural terms to make impossible the ready acceptance of the new 
colonial political economy. Some groups were of course more 
successful than others, in particular the Ce~~iyar merchants of the 
Putukkottai and Ramnad regions who became the principal creditors of 
bankrupt Rajas, as well as the primary purchasers of land which was 
obtained from defaulting i~amtars. 
The encroachment of the merchants upon the proprietary base of 
the new agrarian economy was, of course, not what the British had in 
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mind. The British wanted to introduce a political economy in a rather 
restricted sense, for they were concerned to maintain an agrarian 
stability and order which they saw as predicated upon the preservation 
of the position of the dominant agricultural classes and their natural 
leaders. With respect to their administration of the putative 
"gentry" of these classes, the landlords and princes, the ultimate 
irony was that the British kept wishing to pension these landlords off 
and assume the management of the estates themselves to achieve the 
desired increases in agricultural production. But in those cases 
where the British achieved this goal, they realized that it, too, was 
not what they had in mind. For in the twentieth century when 
nationalism reared its nascent head, loyalty replaced management 
(returning things in some sense to where they had been around 1800) as 
the principal criterion of rulership, and following from this the 
British wanted a state (or estate), the loyalty of which to a ruler 
would ensure, through the ruler's loyalty to the British, the security 
of British rule. What the British had learned (or should have done, 
as should we) was that their twin objectives of security -- viewed as 
the maintenance of the old regime but with the British as the new 
overlords -- and management -- viewed as the introduction of a new 
colonial capitalism -- seemed constantly to militate one against the 
other, as incompatible as twins in those societies where the 
classificatory logic of kinship can accord only one slot to mUltiple 
products of a single parturition. And this incompatibility was 
compounded by the fact that the political systems of pre-British India 
could not be frozen in British ice, allowed to continue on in form but 
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not in content. 
In this paper, I shall explore in a number of specific cases 
the ideological base for and the structural problems which developed 
from this incompletely realized colonial transformation of political 
authority in the southern Tamil countryside. I will focus here on the 
little kings themselves, their transformation into landlords, and the 
implications of the new political economy for the old political logic 
in which rule and property were linked in very different ways. I will 
conclude by examining the implications of my narratives for a 
consideration of colonial state and society, and in particular for the 
complex set of issues involved in determining that all colonial 
transformations were, for inherent structural reasons, incompletely 
realized. 
The "Poligar Wars" 
Perhaps the story of the transition from little king, or 
pa~aiyakirar, to permanently settled rural landholder, or zamindar, is 
best told in the folk epics about heroes such as Kattapomman, who is 
even today a folk hero in Tamil Nadu. 16 Ka~!apomman embodied in his 
short but illustrious career the severe implications of British rule 
for the continuance of old political forms. The ballad opens with a 
long panegyric on Kattapomman and his capital city Pancalankuricci. 
.. -
We hear about the prosperity of this beautiful place, a prosperity 
explained by the presence of this great king, whose court assemblies 
grandly displayed the moral order of the kingdom. The "action" of the 
ballad finally begins when Major Jackson, the Collector of Poligar 
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Peshkash stationed in Ramnad, sends a letter to Kattapomman demanding 
his attendance at his court and the payment of considerable arrears of 
tribute. Thus, the interaction of the old political world with 
British colonial institutions began around the issue of revenue. 
After much deliberation Ka~~apomman collected his army and 
went to Ramnad to meet this impertinent Major, who interrogated 
Kattapomman in an exchange which is perhaps the best known of the 
entire ballad: 
Major Jackson: Who gave Arumukamankalam to you? 
Kattapomman: I gave it to myself. Why should anyone else give 
.. 
it? 
Major Jackson: And why did you seize five hundred sheafs of grain 
in Arunkalam? 
Ka~~apomman: I took it to feed to the birds. Is that so 
treacherous? 
Major Jackson: Why did you steal the cattle of the E:~aiyapuram 
Zamindari? 
Ka~~apomman: I drove them home to give milk to my children. 
Major Jackson: And why have you not payed your taxes for the last 
seven years? 
Ka~~apomman: The heavens shower rain; the earth bears grain; why 
should I pay for my land? Do you collect tax to command the 
elements? Does rain shower at your command? 
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Herein, of course, we can see a fundamental difference in the 
definition of political authority and in the understanding of 
political legitimacy. Ka~~apomman's job as king was precisely to 
command the elements. The ballad began by describing the prosperity 
of the beautiful Pancai country and correlating this prosperity with 
the exalted qualities of this noble king. In marked contrast, the 
British Collector had no moral claim to a share in the produce of this 
land, and on these grounds was ridiculed in the ballad. 
With this exchange as background, the ballad goes on to 
narrate the courageous resistance of Ka~~apomman and his younger mute 
brother, Umaitturai, against the British troops, which in the end 
prevailed. Both Ka~~apomman and Umaitturai were eventually caught, 
and the former was hung in the presence of a select group of 
pa~aiyak8rars who had been especially invited by the British to 
impress upon them the consequences of such rebellion. Subsequent to 
the hanging, however, Umaitturai escaped from prison and joined with 
the Marutu brothers of nearby Civakankai in further resistance. This, 
dubbed by one south Indian historian as the first Indian War of 
Independence,17 ended in 1801 when the British were finally able to 
apprehend the leaders, who met fates as ignominious as their heroic 
predecessor. 
Thus in 1801 the British concluded what had been a half 
century of intermittent warfare against the pa!aiyakarars of southern 
India. These military efforts had begun in the l740s when two 
campaigns were waged by Nawab Anwar-ud-din's son, Muhamed Ali. The 
British joined these efforts when the Nawab, financially in a bad way 
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after the "Second Carnatic War" (1749-17 55) in which he defeated 
Chanda Sahib along with the French and the Mysoreans, requested the 
Company to assist him in an attempt to squeeze some income out of the 
recalcitrant southern chieftains. While this expedition yielded few 
if any military, political, or financial rewards, the combined forces 
did manage to alienate the Kal1ars of Kovilku~i by seizing their brass 
deities and holding them for ransom. 18 In late 1755 the Nawab sent 
Maphuz Khan to be governor of Maturai, which led to renewed outbreaks 
of violence when he joined with groups of pa~aiyakarars against the 
Nawab and his newly sent agent, Khan Sahib, who was posted as Governor 
of Maturai in 1759, a year before he too joined the local 
pa~aiyakarars in rebellion against the Nawab of Arcot. Thereafter 
Company forces joined the Nawab in 1765 and 1767, and in 1783, again 
under the framework of their alliance with the Nawab, the Madras 
Council commissioned Colonel William Fullerton to lead an expedition 
against CivakIri and pancala~kuEicci. These expeditions were little 
more successful than the earlier one, though the percentage of years 
when collections of "poligar peshcash" were made rose more or less 
steadily after 1761, the decade before which they were made only 40 
percent of the time, to the high point of 80 percent during the 
1780s.19 
In 1792, at the conclusion of the Third Mysore War, a treaty 
was concluded between the Nawab and the Company in which the powers of 
administration, in particular the right to collect tribute from the 
pa~aiyakarars in recompense for their military services to the Nawab, 
were handed over to the Company. Nonetheless, the treaty clearly 
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stipulated that the Company was "desirous of preserving the rights of 
sovereignty over the said polygars to the said Nawab," and furthermore 
that the Company would "engage to the utmost of their power, and 
consistent with the realisation of the tributes or peshcush from them, 
to enforce the allegiance and submission of the polygars to the said 
b . . ,,20 Nawa , ~n customary ceremon~es •••• It was under the terms of 
this treaty that the Company pursued with increasing vigor a policy of 
ensuring order among and extracting revenue from the southern 
pa~aiyakarars. In the 1790s collections were made 90 percent of the 
time and the average yearly collection rose from 2,560 chakrams for 
the 1780s to 5,300 chakrams. 21 Throughout this last decade of the 
eighteenth century there were a series of military encounters, which 
culminated in 1799 with the defeat of Kattapommu and in 1801 with the 
.. 
final dissolution of the rebellion. In that year also, on the grounds 
that the Nawab had violated the terms of the 1792 treaty by conspiring 
with Tipu Sultan, a new treaty was drawn up in which the Nawab's 
successor became in effect a pensioner of the Company. 
The traditional historiographic interpretation of Britain's 
conquest of India as virtually absent-minded must therefore not 
obscure the actual military record of those years. And the respect 
the Company held for the palaiyakarars, if not for their moral 
character indubitably for their capacity of military resistance -- a 
capacity based not on technological superiority but on guerilla 
techniques of resistance, deep-rooted local loyalties, as well as the 
threat of their potential collaboration with more powerful foes, from 
the French to Mysoreans -- was very real indeed. The extension of the 
18 
Permanent Settlement in Madras Presidency must thus be seen on the 
backdrop of these long years of warfare, and as testimony to the fact 
that there were still major areas where local kings continued to rule 
with power and authority. 
The Permanent Settlement 
The extension of the Permanent Settlement in Madras Presidency 
has never been examined with great care by historians, who have been 
as a rule far more impressed by its initial formulation in Bengal and 
by Madras' far more original contribution in the ryotwari settlement. 
But virtually one-third of the area of Madras Presidency was settled 
with zamindars, and however much this settlement was a reflex of 
Cornwallis' operation in Bengal, the significance of this southern 
reflex is deserving of some consideration. The terms and operations 
of the southern settlement were based on those devised in Bengal, and 
by the turn of the century the enthusiasm which had accompanied the 
initial drafting of the Permanent Settlement in 1793 was still little 
diminished and not yet under attack by the southern-based advocates of 
ryotwari tenure. But at the same time, the actual drafters of the 
Madras Settlement had many reservations about their handiwork, and 
were by no means apologists for the little kings whom they converted 
into zamindars on the Bengal model. While they shared some of the 
same hopes of those who had prophesied the creation of a new gentried 
class in Bengal, they actually had rather low opinions of the men who 
were supposedly to be made into gentry. 
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Stephen R. Lushington, who was Collector of Poligar Peshkash 
during the crucial years of the formulation of the Permanent 
Settlement from 1799 to 1803, was one of the most severe critics of 
the pa~aiyakirars, and yet he seems never to have given public 
expression to any doubts about the wisdom of the Permanent Settlement. 
His note on the "Origins of the Poliagars,,22 was not only one of the 
principal texts of the settlement, but has been cited more frequently 
than any other in subsequent discussions of this chiefly group. In 
this note Lushington advanced the following conclusions about their 
origins: 
First, that the pretension which the Poligars advance to their 
present lands, on the ground of ancient immemorial possession, 
have little foundation. Secondly, that they were created about 
300 years ago, by the policy of the hindoo Government, for the 
protection of the country and the support of the Sovereign; and 
that in the time of Tiruma1a Naicke, 160 years ago, they had not 
degenerated from the original purpose of the institution. 
Thus he saw their existence as totally contingent on an arrangement 
with a sovereign ruler, and thereby accorded full authority to the 
Company to develop an appropriate policy with respect to the 
pa~aiyak;rars, as he interpreted them to have no independent 
proprietary rights. Moreover, his characterization of the 
pa~aiyak;rars was hardly flattering: 
Their insolent tyranny in the absence of authority is as 
proverbial as their treacherous intrigue in the presence of it, 
and ••• your records teem with relations of their delight in 
times of tumult and disorder, when all their favorite passions of 
tyrann~s~ng over the country and of contempt for their rulers may 
with impurity be indulged. • • • 
The tyranny of the pa!aiyakarars was explained by two principal 
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factors. First, Lushington claimed, 
The assumed power and state set up by these people is most 
attended to, and we believe will be found the principal cause for 
their turbulence. It misleads the most powerful to uphold 
themselves against the Circar and it stimulates the rest to 
rivalry and insolence. This propensity is to be seen in the six 
principal Poligars. • •• These men have indulged themselves and 
we have no doubt still rest their ideal consequence upon their 
Forts, a few old guns, and a wretched equipment of stores 
• • • by which they overawe their weaker neighbors. The false 
pride derived from thence demands attention as the source of a 
spirit of insolence and aggression in the Poligar that is fatal 
to all order, obedience, and security of property. 
The second source for the pa~aiya~rars' actions rested, according to 
Lushington, in their illegal appropriation of "desha cawel" 
(tecakkaval), or rights to protection over the countryside which 
justified collecting taxes of a sort, which he saw as one of their 
most invidious means of oppression: 
The Collection of it was made in the most oppressive manner, by 
parties of armed peons, whom the Poligar detaches from his fort 
as suits his convenience, and who receives payments in money or 
in grain, cattle, etc., according to circumstances; the payment 
of the tax being often disputed and becoming the cause of many 
quarrels and the armed peons employed on these occasions 
frequently compelling the inhabitants to allow them batta, betel, 
etc., and putting them to considerable inconvenience besides 
extra expence. 
Thus one of the first recommendations made by Lushington was that as 
soon as it was possible the "desha cawel" right should be abolished. 
Lushington further recommended that the pa~aiyak;rars' forts should be 
demolished, their firearms appropriated, and their tribute increased. 
Without firearms they would not be able to collect the "desha cawel" 
fees, and with a higher tribute they would have fewer resources to 
justify their arrogance and support their establishment. The higher 
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tribute was explained as a commutation of "desha cawel." 
The Company did follow these recommendations. A report of 
1803 from the Special Commission to the Governor in Council, Ft. St. 
George, explained the adoption of such a policy in terms which 
congratulated the Company's enlightened attitude and "progressive 
approach": 23 
The Honorable Court have uniformly insisted on the absolute 
suppression of the military power of the poligars; and on the 
substitution of a pecuniary tribute more proportionate than the 
ordinary peishcush, to the resources of the poligar countries, 
and more adequate to the public demand, for defraying the 
expenses of general protection and government. The circumstances 
connected with the rebellion of the poligar (Kattaboma Nayaka) of 
Panjalamcourchy; the general commotion excited in the southern 
provinces, subsequently to the defection of that chieftain; the 
punishment of the rebellious chiefs, by the confiscation of their 
lands; the demolition of the poligar forts; the discontinuance of 
their military retinues; the consequent augmentation of the 
public revenue, and the several proclamations published by the 
authority of your Lordship in Council; are events which serve to 
mark the progressive approach in the administration of poligar 
affairs, inculcated by the Court of Directors, and enforced by 
the necessity of providing for the internal tranquillity, and for 
the efficient exercise of the authority of government over that 
part of the British territories. 
But we might ask, why stop here? If the pa~aiyakarars were such a 
scourge, why not make settlements with the principal ryots, as was 
done later in the nineteenth century in many parts of Madras 
Presidency. 
The reason why not was succinctly stated in a Minute of the 
24 Board of Revenue, dated 5th January 1818: 
The ancient zamindars and polygars were in fact the nobility of 
the country, and though the origin of their tenures would not 
bear too minute a scrutiny, they were connected with the people 
by ties which it was more politic, more liberal, and more just to 
strengthen, than to dissolve ••• when the attachment of the 
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people to their native chieftains and the local situation of many 
zamindaries are considered, it may be greatly doubted whether 
such a policy (of reducing them to pensioners) would not have 
been as unwise as it would have been ungenerous, and at the time 
perhaps impracticable. 
The question as to whether their decision had more to do with "wisdom" 
than "generosity" notwithstanding, it never seems really to have 
occurred to officials such as Lushington, who worked in the areas of 
the palaiyakarars, that settlements should not be made with the local 
chiefs. When opposition to the Permanent Settlement mounted in years 
subsequent to its enactment in 1803, the principal opponents were men 
who worked in areas, such as the Baramahal, where the traditional 
structure of political authority had already been significantly eroded 
by the revenue and political policies of the Muslim rulers of 
It might further be argued that a major impetus 
behind the ryotwari settlement came not from actual experience in 
India, but from the changing intellectual climate of Britain in the 
early nineteenth century.26 
The Permanent Settlement in Madras was explicitly modeled on 
the settlement which had been made ten years before in Bengal. It was 
the firm intention of the President and Members of the Board of 
Revenue that the "zamindars" should be constituted "proprietors of 
their respective estates" on the basis "of the principals on which the 
permanent settlement has been established in Bengal.,,27 For the 
Board, the only major difficulties they saw when they enunciated this 
policy in 1799 were to determine the proper amount of peshkash and to 
ascertain the "rights of the Talookdars, or under Tenantry throughout 
the different districts, that in confirming the proprietary rights of 
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the Zemindars we may not violate the ascertained right of other 
individuals." 
The Board felt that the security afforded by the Permanent 
Settlement in Madras would have even more dramatic consequences than 
in Bengal, where a "more regular form of government • • • has been 
gradually established.,,28 So while they wished to estimate the 
permanent peshkash according to the "probable improvement in the 
course of a short period under the system of property and security 
about to take place,,,29 the fundamental justification of the 
permanence of the settlement was, as in Bengal, its "productive 
principle": 30 
that the possession of property and the sure enjoyment of the 
benefits deriveable from it, will awaken and stimulate industry, 
promote agriculture, extend improvement, establish credit, and 
augment the general wealth, and prosperity. Hence arises the 
best security that no permanent dimunition can be expected to 
take place at least to any considerable amount •••• 
Even so, the rhetoric of the settlement did not make it any easier for 
the Collectors to establish what an appropriate amount would be. 
Neither did it counteract Lushington's prescription for enhancing the 
tribute. Lushington's constant complaint was that the turmoil of the 
eighteenth century, particularly when combined with the monopoly of 
revenue records in the hands of corrupt village officers, made it 
difficult to establish any proper notion of precedent. Of course, the 
British view of the second half of the eighteenth century allowed them 
to see decadence in customary form, and in this vein Lushington's 
assurance that there had been a system of regular payments was based 
more on conviction that historical acuity. Elsewhere Lushington wrote 
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that the alienation of extensive tracts of land as i~am benefits was 
nothing more than an established mode of tax evasion, rather than a 
vital component of the precolonial political process. And where inams 
were seen as straightforward remunerative grants for military service, 
the East India Company shared his belief that tribute had to be at 
least in part assessed on the basis of the commutation of military 
service, which was no longer seen as necessary. In the end, the usual 
principle followed by Lushington, as for example in Ramnad, was to 
take two-thirds of the average collections of the six previous 
years. 31 In zamindaries where actual rebellions took place, such as 
Civakankai, the determination of peshkash proved more difficult as 
previous collections had been "irregular.,,32 But the major point to 
be noticed here is that the average collection was determined on the 
basis of collections after 1792, when the British had taken over the 
administration of the pa~aiyakarars and had raised the average 
collections by more than a factor of two. 
The more general theoretical question that emerged in the 
Permanent Settlement was in what sense the rights of the zamindars 
would be "proprietary." This question was never adequately resolved, 
and gave birth to immense practical difficulties in the years to come. 
In the Sunnud-I-Milkeut Istimirar or Deed of Permanent Settlement, it 
was noted that up until 1803 the practice of the British Government 
was simply a continuation of the "established practice of Asiatic 
Governments"; such practice consisted of constantly augmenting the 
revenue assessment, and replacing the Zamindars by revenue officials 
of Government's choosing, "thereby reserving to the ruling power the 
25 
implied right and actual exercise of the proprietary possession of all 
lands whatever." By the Permanent Settlement the British Government 
would end this sorry state of affairs -- "so fruitful a source of 
uncertainty and disquietude" - by granting to "Zamindars and other 
landholders, their heirs and successors, a permanent property in their 
land in all time to come." However, this permanent proprietary right 
was not to be absolute. First, it was dependent on the proper and 
punctual payment of peshkash. Default in revenue would give the 
British a free hand to assume the estate. Second, this right would 
not infringe upon the established rights of the "undertenantry." To 
accomplish this, the zamindars were enjoined to 
enter engagements with your ryots either for a rent in money or 
in kind; and ••• within a reasonable time grant to each ryot a 
pattah or kowle clearly defining the amount to be paid him and 
explaining every condition of the engagement. • • • 
The zamindars were to be held accountable for these arrangements in 
the local courts. Third, the Government reserved to itself rights 
over revenue derived from salt, liquor, sales, and market taxes, as 
well as rights over all i~am, or lakhiraj, lands, in addition to lands 
which in the past were for the support of the police establishment. 
The assumption of control over all i~am lands, however, was not to be 
construed to mean that the zamindars could no longer alienate land. 
According to Article 7 of the deed: 
You shall be at free liberty to transfer without the previous 
consent of Government or of any other authority, to whomsoever 
you may think proper, either by sale, gift, or otherwise, your 
proprietary right in the whole or in any part of your zamindary. 
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The zamindar had only to register any such transfer in the Collector's 
office and to be consistent with the principles of native law in the 
provisions of his alienation. The bottom line was that no alienation 
could reduce the permanent peshkash, for which the "whole Zamindary 
shall continue to be answerable • • • as if no such transact had 
occurred." 
However abridged the nature of this proprietary right, it is 
clear that the single greatest innovation afforded by the Permanent 
Settlement was this establishment, to use Ranajit Guha's phrase, of a 
"rule of property.,,33 Property was now to govern political relations. 
In the case of the Permanent Settlement, the k~atra (the encompassing 
lordship of all land) of the king was to be translated into a title, 
or ~:~a (a term which previously meant a title, usually of some 
heroic and/or royal association, as well kingship itself: the 
coronation festival for kings was called the Pa:~apicekam), indicating 
particular, and legally negotiable, ownership of land. The rights to 
land of the "cultivators" were deemed under this system to be tenancy 
rights rather than proprietary rights. While Thomas Munro had his own 
polemical purpose in writing this, since he was advocating direct 
settlements with the "cultivators" in a scheme called the ryotwari 
system, he was correct to assert that,34 
We have, in our anxiety to make everything as English as possible 
in a country which resembles England in nothing, attempted to 
create at once throughout extensive provinces, a kind of landed 
property which had never existed in them; 
As Munro predicted, the nineteenth century did not witness the actual 
creation of a landed gentry, as many had hoped, but rather, at least 
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in British terms, a steady deterioration of the state of agrarian 
affairs. 
Many of the estates went immediately into arrears. As noted 
before, the energies of the zamindars went into diverse avenues of 
"local intrigue" and were spent in running up debts, litigating in 
courts over succession and other issues of property and office, and 
alienating increasing amounts of land from the local tax base. Not 
only were the expectations of the Permanent Settlement often 
unfulfilled, so too were the terms of the Settlement. Time and time 
again the British bailed the zamindars out from their desperate 
positions of improvidence and indebtedness. 
The estate of Uttumalai is a good case in point. In 1836 the 
Collector of Tinnevelly District investigated the resources of this 
estate which had been in arrears for some years. His initial 
suspicion was that the value of the estate might have been 
overestimated by Lushington when the Permanent Peshkash was 
instituted, but at the conclusion of his investigation he wrote: 35 
This estate cannot be expected to rise to its intrinsic value at 
once, but I hope I have clearly showed the estimate of its 
resources made by Mr. Lushington is not overrated and I am 
sanguine in being able to show by the out turn of the current year 
a very considerable improvement, so long however as the Zamindar 
is connected with it in any shape, that connection cannot fail to 
operate as a retarding and material obstacle to a better order of 
things •••• 
The Collector thus proceeded to recommend that the Government assume 
the estate on the grounds that 
the feudal feeling that exists in an Old Estate always operates 
powerfully to prevent the inhabitants from complaining and 
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seeking redress but there is no doubt the Zemindar and his 
adherents are widely disliked and feared by the peaceable part of 
the community and that this feeling has much contributed to its 
long impoverishment. 
And yet, after a long correspondence, the Board of Revenue finally 
decided to restore the estate to the Zamindar. The subsequent 
Collector was outraged at this decision, not because of the 
restoration of the zamindary so much as because all of its debts were 
written off, an act which the Collector feared would be misinterpreted 
by other zamindars who had just agreed to comply with complicated 
arrangements to repay debts of long standing. 36 In simil~r cases, the 
Government for the most part restrained the enthusiasm of Collectors 
who felt the Government could do a much better job of managing the 
estates, arguing instead "the acknowledged expediency of preserving 
the ancient aristocracy of the country.,,37 And so, with certain 
exceptions such as Cokkampa~~i (which even so was restored twenty-five 
years after it was assumed in 1834 when the troublesome zamindar was 
expelled from the estate and confined in prison), most estates were 
preserved from extinction in spite of their failure to conform to the 
principles of management espoused by the British Government. 
The preservation of the "ancient aristocracy of the country" 
was conducted in the face of mounting criticism of the Permanent 
Settlement by prominent members of Government such as Thomas Munro. 
38 In 1824 Munro wrote that, 
we have relinquished the rights which the sovereign always 
possessed in the soil, and we have in many cases deprived the 
real owners, the occupant ryots, of their proprietary rights and 
bestowed them on Zemindars and other imaginary landlords. 
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Earlier that year the Court of Directors observed: 39 
There can be no doubt that evils of such magnitude as those so 
forcibly pointed out by the Board demand an immediate and 
adequate remedy. The levy of extra assessment on the ryots, by 
Reddies, Curnums, Zemindars, and other persons in power and 
office, appears to be frequent, and application to the regular 
courts on the part of the Ryots for relief, from the expense, 
delay, and other inconveniences • is altogether hopeless. 
A. D. Campbell, who was at one time Secretary to the Board of Revenue, 
prepared a report on land tenure in 1832 for a Select Committee of the 
House of Commons in which he was less overtly critical but nonetheless 
insistent that the provisions of the Permanent Settlement be 
interpreted to include a statement of proprietary rights for the 
cultivator: 40 
The Zemindar's undeniable and often hereditary property in the 
land revenue of his entire zemindary was confounded with the 
separate property in the land itself, which, as a cultivator, he 
possessed in some of his fields alone and as he in general 
happened to occupy, in the ranks of society in India, the place 
held by the gentry or aristocracy in Europe, this fortuitous 
circumstance tended to confirm the error, and seems to have 
rendered it a matter even of policy to acknowledge him in the new 
light of the landed proprietor, not only of his own fields, but 
of every field. • • • 
Campbell and Munro both felt that the original intention of the 
Permanent Settlement had to be restored in the face of the 
encroachment of the rights of zamindars on those of the ryots. But in 
spite of all this the rights of the Zamindars were protected far more 
zealously than those of the ryots. 
Another type of objection to the Permanent Settlement appeared 
rather later, and is summed up in a lengthy polemical paper by H. R. 
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Farmer entitled: "On the Subject of the Extent of, and Rights of 
Government Which Though Excluded from the Settlement Made with 
Zamindaries and other Holders of Proprietary Estates is Now Shown in 
the Maps as Forming Part of these Estates.,,4l The specific question 
addressed by Farmer was whether or not the Government had any rights 
over the "puEampokku" lands within the zamindaries, i.e. the 
"uncultivated, arable, and waste lands," or whether they had given 
them up in perpetuity to the zamindars by the provisions of deed of 
Permanent Settlement. As we saw earlier, the only lands explicitly 
reserved by Government were those set aside for police establishments 
and lands under the heading of lakhiraj. According to Farmer, the key 
to the problem rested in the faulty interpretation of that term. 
Whereas lakhiraj was conventionally understood to mean only igam, or 
tax-free land, Farmer maintained that it really meant all "waste" 
lands as well. Farmer's confidence in the acceptability of his 
etymological claim, however, was belied by his strong emphasis on the 
amount of money the Government was losing annually by forfeiting all 
revenue claims to such land. In the end, Farmer's argument was simply 
another victim of the spirit of the Permanent Settlement, which had 
clearly implied that the possibility of cultivating waste lands was 
part of the incentive built into the settlement scheme. Eighty years 
into the nineteenth century memories of the former position of these 
chiefs were rather dim, and the absence of any southern participation 
in the 1857 "Mutiny" made them even dimmer. But, however hasty and 
ill-conceived the establishment of the settlement might have been, its 
permanence, which was instrumental in the design to restore agrarian 
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order and assure a regular payment of tribute, was basic to its 
constitution, and Farmer's inability to get anywhere with his proposal 
attests to this. 
The most significant problem of the zamindaries in the 
nineteenth century was not Farmer's, but rather that the Settlement 
had failed to achieve even its limited objectives. In British terms, 
the major manifestation of this problem was that rather than operating 
in the pursuit of profit, the zamindars, as mentioned above, continued 
to engage in activities that seemed antithetical to this pursuit. One 
such activity was the alienation of land, which among other things 
eroded the tax base of the zamindaries. We shall now look at this 
problem in more detail. 
The Problem of Alienation: The Gift Colonized 
The Permanent Settlement had established a rule of property, 
or so it seemed. As the British set up the framework and institutions 
of colonial governance it became increasingly clear that property 
itself was to be governed by law. Law was seen as a counterbalance to 
the unprincipled exercise of political power. In Britain these 
notions were developed to a new degree under the influence of Bentham 
d h ·1· . . hI· h 42 an t e ut1 1tar1ans 1n t e ear y n1neteent century. Law was also, 
though I am unaware about any explicit ideological enuncation of this, 
to deflect the political implications of such major questions as 
property holding and tenancy rights under the new political econo~my of 
colonialism. Stated in ideal terms, the importation of law into India 
was to secure the loyalties and protect the rights of all its 
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citizens. However, the effective operation of law as an autonomous 
domain was belied by the constant manufacture of acts and regulations 
to direct and constrain the free play of legal norms and procedures. 
And yet, however much the working of the law was ultimately controlled 
by the interests of the colonial state, it is indisputable that the 
daily exercise of the law had a peculiar, though partial, autonomy 
from Government, often frustrating Members of Council and the Board of 
Revenue to the point of utter distraction. 
While the law was vested with the "rule over property" and had 
such an esteemed position in the structure of British rule, it was 
never really clear what law in India was to be. The British assumed 
that there were two things called Hindu law and Muslim law, a somewhat 
preposterous claim given the variability of Indian legal traditions. 
Even so staunch an advocate of the law as James Mill was sharply 
critical of the efforts of Sir William Jones to codify Indian law. He 
characterized Jones' efforts as "a disorderly compilation of loose, 
vague, stupid or unintelligible quotations and maxims: selected 
arbitrarily from books of law, books of devotion, and books of poetry; 
attended with a commentary which only adds to the mass of absurdity 
and darkness; a farrago by which nothing is defined, nothing 
established.,,43 Mill's venom was directed at both Indian law and the 
Orientalists' sanctification of it, not the law itself or the 
principles of legal codification. Other less eurocentric critics such 
as Madras' J. H. Nelson were critical of the reliance on Brahmanic 
codes (and pundits) to formulate codes for non-Brahmans, 44 who 
constituted 97 percent of the population in the south. 
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While all these criticisms rang true, the real problem was far 
more fundamental, and lay in the very institutionalization and 
codification of the law. All of these critics shared the belief in 
the autonomy of law. However, in pre-British Hindu India the law was 
embedded in the structure of political authority and measured against 
dharma, a principle of order which was both natural and moral. As 
b · . I· I d· I h . 45 Ro ert L~ngat, an author~ty on c ass~ca In ~an aw, as wr~tten: 
Western juridical systems are based on the concept of legality. 
Whether strictly speaking a written law or the common law, the 
law is understood to express the will of all. Even in cases 
where it has done no more than declare the customary law or case 
law in the form of codes, its imperative force resides entirely 
in the popular will or constitutionally established authority 
which has sanctioned it, and not in the power and usage or custom 
which lies behind, and has in a sense given birth to, that law. 
What is just, within the meaning of those systems, is that which 
is legal, i.e. that which conforms to law. What is unjust, and 
thus irregular and reprehensible, is that which is illegal, i.e. 
contrary to law, i.e. to an actual provision of law. • • • The 
classical legal system of India substitutes the notion of 
authority for that of legality. The precepts of ~ are an 
authority because in them was seen the expression of a law in the 
sense in which that word is used in the natural sciences, a law 
which rules human activity. 
The king, as Lingat explains, has the role of imposing the law, for 
the law does not impose itself, at least in an immediate sense. But 
his real duty is to interpret the law according to each context of its 
application. The authority of the interpreter, and thus the 
interpretation, does not, however, yield a system of codes and 
precedents that can, at least independently, orient future legal 
decisions. Authority continues to be invested in the complex but 
integral relationship of the authoritative interpreter and dharma. As 
Lingat notes, although the judgments of the king are "really law-in-
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action, they remain singular and unrelated, staccato, without any 
future.,,46 Thus, while the king is constrained by the principles of 
dharma, he is at the same time enjoined to maintain dharma, and as 
such he becomes the embodiment of the law. 
Under the Permanent Settlement the zamindars were invested 
neither with political nor with legal authority. Political authority, 
in the form of British rule, had made them proprietors of their 
estates, and their proprietary rights were to be protected and 
regulated by the legal authority of nascent institutions and hastily 
conceived and executed codes of jurisprudence. This complex 
background oriented a great number of issues in the nineteenth 
century, from disputes of succession and the division of property to 
the problem of alienation. And in cases which concerned zamindaries, 
the problems of adjudication became particularly byzantine because 
while the properties of joint families were seen by ordinary Hindu law 
to be partible estates, "the theory as to ancient Zemindaries has 
always been that they are in the nature of regalities or 
principalities, the property attached to which is inseparable from the 
regal or princely office.,,47 The most fundamental problems with the 
zamindaries began in the actual drafting of the deed of Permanent 
Settlement, which presumed, as Munro had noted, the possibility of 
creating a new society based on the principles of property and law 
which were as foreign as they proved unworkable. And this is where 
the problem of alienation takes on its double meaning. 
As we have seen, the deed of Permanent Settlement put few 
restrictions on the power of the zamindar to alienate, "by sale, gift, 
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or otherwise," any part of the zamindari estate. Little did the 
drafters of the Permanent Settlement suspect that the ambiguities of 
this clause would haunt their administrative successors for at least a 
century. They did not anticipate such a turn of events because they 
did not understand the cultural logic of politics in the old regime. 
What the British saw as tax evasion was in fact the "gift," as I 
described it in the first section. Lushington was in fact wrong to 
suggest that i~ams were given away to reduce the tax roles, even as 
Eric Stokes, far more recently, was wrong to see inams as having 
swelled "to an unnatural extent" due to the "long period of disturbed 
political conditions and unstable central authority" in the period 
prior to the early nineteenth century.48 Lushington, of course, 
wished to characterize i~ams as forms of tax evasion because he was 
directly charged with the collection of the poligar peshkash as well 
as with the resumption, to the extent possible, of all military 
tenures. Later in the nineteenth century, after the Permanent 
Settlement, the apparent irony was that i~ams continued to be given 
away even when the tax had been permanently fixed. 
Within the context of the British attempt to control 
alienation as part of the permanent settlement, two legal questions 
developed quickly as major issues: the first had to do with the 
status of certain alienations made before 1803, and the second had to 
do with those made after 1803, when successors to zamindari titles 
began to complain about the encumbrances on their estates handed down 
by their predecessors. 
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As for the first issue, all had not been made clear by the 
assumption of British control over i~am lands within the estates at 
the time of the Permanent Settlement. For example, there were a great 
number of lands rented at a low rate on perpetual leases dating to a 
period before the Permanent Settlement. In one case49 in the large 
Tinnevelly estate of E:~aiyapuEam, the zamindar claimed his right to 
resume fifteen villages which had been granted on cuttoogootaga tenure 
"in consideration of military services performed by the ancestors of 
the grantee." The case was taken to court by the zamindar, and it was 
decided against him. The reason was that the court judged the 
favorable lease not to be an alienation: 
This is not an alienation of the Zemindary, or any part of it. 
It is a perpetual lease of a distinct portion of the Zemindary, 
which constituted a distinct portion before the Appellant's title 
to the Zemindary accrued. • • • 
A similar case occurred in Ramnad in 1850, when the British denied the 
reversionary right of the zamindarini to lands alienated as magiyam 
prior to the Permanent Settlement. 50 In both of these cases the 
hereditary nature of the "leases" was established by their 
venerability, and the reversionary right of the zamindar denied both 
because of their heritability and because of the classificatory logic 
invoked. And yet these classificatory assumptions were in other cases 
contradicted. For instance, lands in Civakankai of a similar 
description to those above were held to be i~am. In all these cases 
the classificatory decisions were motivated by the desire to preserve 
the status quo. 
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The desire on the part of the British to maintain the status 
quo (assuming wrongly, of course, that there was anything static about 
what had gone on before 1803) led to far more serious legal debates 
concerning lands alienated after 1803. In retrospect it is amazing 
that such fundamental questions as the hereditary nature of 
alienations and the future reversionary rights of zamindars were not 
addressed, nor the problems concerning them anticipated, in the 
Permanent Settlement. The drafters of the Settlement apparently 
assumed that the fixed nature of the peshkash would restrict excessive 
gifts of land, but they could not have been more wrong. Alienations 
were made to attain religious merit, to establish political alliances, 
to reward services, and to payoff debts. Alienations were made 
because in spite of the changing nature of the political system, the 
traffic of the political process continued to be in gifts of land. 
The consequences of this were startling to the British, allover 
India, as they saw the maintenance of the dominant landed classes in 
their privileged position as crucial to the stability of the agrarian 
economy. Long before the British passed legislation in the Punjab to 
restrict the transfer of land from "peasants" to "money-lenders," they 
fought battles of one zamindar after another in southern India to 
resume land alienated by zamindari predecessors to groups such as the 
Ce~!iy;rs, whose merchant associations and usurious activities made 
them inappropriate and undesirable landholders in British eyes. No 
sooner, of course, did one zamindar win his battle than he set the 
stage for a subsequent confrontation by alienating more land to new 
people and sometimes new groups. 
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In 1871, J. D. Mayne, the Acting Advocate General, was asked 
to give his opinion about the status of two alienations in Ramnad, and 
his response became thereafter much cited as a general authoritative 
position on all such matters. 5l The first question he addressed had 
to do with what restrictions there were on the zamindar's rights of 
alienation, and this question rapidly turned him to a consideration of 
the possible restrictions constituted by Hindu law. Did the 
application of Hindu law, for example, mean that the zamindar could 
neither encumber nor alienate beyond the period of his own life? In 
this respect, the ordinary statutes of Hindu law dictated that as 
one's heirs became at birth coparceners, any Hindu proprietor could 
not, without his heirs' consent, or "unless under circumstance of 
necessity," alienate more than his own interest in the estate. But, 
as Mayne observed, the zamindari is not an ordinary Hindu estate. In 
an ordinary estate the father and sons are actual joint owners in 
possession, but a zamindary is "impartible": 
Neither the land nor the annually accruing income is divisible, 
and the joint interest of the heir does not vest in enjoyment 
till the death of the holder. The consequence therefore, is that 
the father has a complete estate for life -- and the next heir 
has a complete estate after his death. 
The implications of this were clear enough to Mayne. Hindu law 
provided no counterbalance to the deed of Permanent Settlement. The 
only possible restriction on alienation he saw had to do with the 
statute of limitations, which was of twelve years. 52 The question 
then arose as to whether the limitation should begin from the date of 
the grant (or, perhaps, its registration in the Collector's Office), 
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or from the date of accession of an heir who might have reason to 
desire the resumption of his predecessor's alienations. Mayne 
interpreted a number of High Court decisions to stipulate expr'essly 
that the former case was to be taken as the intent of the law, in 
spite of certain misgivings he had: 
It certainly does seem to be an anomaly that this should be so. 
The heir could certainly not sue for possession of the property 
during the life of his father, nor could he sue to undo the act 
of his father except so far as it might injure himself and the 
injury to himself, would not arise till his father's death ••• 
On the other hand, the words of the statute are express, and it 
has been held by a Full Court in Bengal, that when the statute of 
limitations has run against a widow, it will also bar a 
reversioner, which is exactly a parallel case. 
Mayne gave no hope to the Collector about his possible success in 
recovering certain alienations on behalf of the minor zamindar on 
these grounds as well due to the expiry of the limitation. 
Mayne also considered the legal complexities of cases which 
concerned lands rented on favorable leases. He classified such leases 
into three types. The first were what he called "service" i~ams, of 
which there were two sub-types: (1) igams on amaram tenure, the 
important feature of which he said to be the performance of services 
to the zamindar himself, and these he saw as "resumable at pleasure, 
as soon as he (the zamindar) chooses to dispense with the services"; 
and (2) tenures for service "for the public or the Government," and 
these he said "will not be resumable on the ceasing of the duties, 
unless the continued performance of the service was the whole motive 
to, and consideration for the grant." Mayne noted that the second 
type of perpetual leases, those at full assessment, for whatever 
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duration, were to be considered equally binding on the zamindar and 
his successors. As for the third type, leases at a favorable rent, 
Mayne considered them as binding on the grantor, but not the 
successor. Mayne did not examine the classificatory problems involved 
in this scheme, particularly given the arbitrariness of the term 
"alienation" as alluded to earlier. But, whatever these problems, and 
however much subsequent legal opinion deviated from Mayne's 
interpretations, the questions he addressed in this memo turned out to 
be fundamental to the deliberation about the nature and extent of 
intervention allowed to the British administrators. Mayne concluded 
his memo by noting that in any case the Government need not worry: 
Government has no ground for the alarm expressed. • • • No act 
of the Zemindar in alienating his assets by lease or otherwise, 
can in any degree diminish the security for the public 
revenue. • • • The public demand ••• takes precedence of all 
other encumbrances, and in the event of either attachment or 
sale, the Collector in the former case and the purchases in the 
latter case, are in no way bound by any alienation or dimunition 
of the assets of the Zemindary. 
But, Mayne's assurances notwithstanding, the concern of the British 
Government was to keep such a turn of events from happening. They 
were as concerned about public order as they were about the public 
demand (i.e., revenue), both of which they saw as indissolubly linked 
and as dependent on the preservation of local elites. Time after time 
this ideal union seemed to come unhinged, as we shall see in two cases 
from Ramnad where Mayne's principles were put to the test. 
The first case concerns the alienation of two taluks in Ramnad 
Zamindari, Pantalku:i and P~~aiyampatti, the first in 1858 (the 
initial grant of which was confirmed in 1863) and the second in 1863. 
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The first alienation was made by the then minor zamindar's adoptive 
mother, and the confirmation and grant of 1863 were made by the 
zamindar when he came of age. The recipient of both alienations was 
Po~gucami Tevar, the original grantor's sister's eldest son, and 
brother of her adopted son, the minor zamindar. Poggucami Tevar was 
also the manager of Ramnad Zamindari between 1858 and 1868, and a man 
of very considerable influence. He attained this influence for the 
reasons cited to explain the granting of the two ta1uks to him: 
because of his services as manager and his legal support and efforts 
in getting the adoption approved upon which a long fought succession 
case had hinged. By 1868, the year of poggucami's dismissal, he had 
involved the estate in debts of at least fourteen and a half lakhs, 
and he left his office in a trail of accusations about this 
corruption. In 1873, shortly after the death of the zamindar, the 
Board of Revenue considered what legal steps could be taken to 
reappropriate on behalf of the new minor zamindar the considerable 
- . 53 lands which had been alienated to PonggucamL. 
The legal questions involved turned out to be very delicate. 
The Statute of Limitations had run out for the 1858 grant, unless it 
could be shown that the 1863 confirmation was the legal date of the 
grant, and this was unlikely. Even if Hindu law respecting 
inheritance was invoked as relevant to the case, all of the 
alienations were made before the birth of the minor on behalf of whom 
the suits were being instituted. The conclusion of the Government 
Pleader, J. W. Handley, was therefore that the Government must argue 
that from the principle of "impartibility" it should "follow that 
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until the Raj is extinct the property must remain for the Raja to 
take, and hence that the holder of the Raj for the time being can 
neither encumber nor alienate beyond the period of his own life.,,54 
In supporting this position Handley was aware that, while there was 
some legal precedent, it would perhaps be "difficult to reconcile the 
extensive power of alienation allowed by later cases for family 
necessities with the dictum in its widest sense." But he was equally 
aware that 
if the contention of the defendants in this case is correct, any 
zemindar with no male heirs, on coming of age and before he has 
any children, can alienate the whole of his Zemindari thus 
entirely defeat the rights of his after born sons and the rights 
of the Government to succeed to escheat in default of such sons. 
Assuming that his opinion was correct, he felt sure that the only 
necessary evidence to win the suit would be to document the undue 
influence of poggucami Tevar in securing the grants. 
Handley's opinion was used to justify the institution of a 
suit for the recovery of the two taluks against the descendents of 
PO~Bucami Tevar (who had died in 1869) in late 1873. 55 The Government 
based its suit on the claims that poggucami, who received otherwise 
proper remuneration for having acted as manager, "fraudulently induced 
them (the late zamindar and his mother) to grant the said villages to 
him without any proper consideration," on the fact that the grants 
were not properly registered, and because "by Hindu law, and the 
custom of the zemindari, • the late Zemindar had only a life-
interest in the zemindari, and (n)either he nor his adoptive mother 
had power to alienate this or any portion of the said zemindari beyond 
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the period of their lives." In the judgment, rendered on February 12, 
1874, the Government lost its case. 
According to the judge, who echoed much of Mayne's original 
opinion, even if general Hindu law was followed, there would be no 
restriction on alienation for those without any coparceners. As for 
the particular case of zamindaries, the judge noted that the only 
obvious difference was that succession was governed by primogeniture, 
and thus the estate was impartible. But he disputed Handley's claim 
that alienability depends on partibility: 
prima facie partibility r~stricts rather than creates 
alienability. • • • Whatever prejudices may have existed in the 
minds of the old sages against alienation, at the present day it 
is too late to say that all property is not alienable if there is 
an absolute owner. If it is once conceded that a person with co-
parceners can alienate the whole, and if there are none in the 
position of co-parceners, or if the person seeking to set aside 
the alienation was not in that position, I cannot see how the 
question of the right to alienate can be affected by the property 
being partible or the reverse. The result of course may be a 
Zemindar without a zemindary, But I suppose he could drop his 
title. 
He went on to say that even if the zamindari was considered on 
absolutely separate grounds as a (or as analogous to a) kingdom, he 
did not "understand why even a kingdom should be absolutely 
inalienable by an absolute monarch, much less a tributary 
principality, which was the utmost dignity to which Ramnad ever 
attained." Neither did he understand the claim that the zamindar had 
only a "life-interest," on the grounds that legal precedent had 
indubitably established the opposite in a variety of types of cases. 
The judge concluded his opinion by saying that nonregistration was in 
this case not an issue, and that he saw no evidence of undue influence 
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by poggucami in securing the grants. And thus, once again, alienation 
carried the day. 
The second case to be considered here concerns those lands 
rented at favorable rates, many on permanent leases. In Ramnad these 
leases were called "cowles," and the leader of the battle against 
their legality was Lee Warner, the Special Assistant Collector, who 
successfully urged the Collector (with the sanction of the Court of 
Wards) in 1873 to issue a notice to all cowledars in Ramnad that their 
leases were to be canceled and their villages to be resumed by the 
Government on behalf of the minor Zamindar. Some of the cowledars 
immediately gave up their lands, but others, particularly those of 
some means, decided to contest the legality of the proclamation. It 
was at this point that J. A. Boyle entered the scene, and in October 
of 1873 he wrote a report in which he suggested the untenability of 
the Government's case. 56 Even the test case selected by Lee Warner 
for legal advice met with the negative opinion of Handley, who wrote 
that the possible justifications for a permanent lease were more 
various than Lee Warner had thought. 57 For example, Boyle noted that 
Lee Warner had a special but unjustified distaste for the Chetties 
(Ce~~iyars) who acquired leases in return for unpaid loans: 
Mr. Lee Warner speaks with the vulgar dislike of usurers when he 
says that the Chetties made use of their influential position as 
creditors to extort cowles at low rates. Such transactions, 
however, so far from amounting to extortion, might be the most 
legitimate arrangements between a money lender and his deeply 
involved debtor. Who can blame a creditor, and what Court would 
set aside his contract because he required something more 
substantial than promises to pay from a spendthrift Zemindar? 
In addition, Boyle saw nothing fraudulent in other grants to relatives 
45 
and palace servants for much the same reason: the zamindar had no 
money to part with, only land. Indeed, Boyle noted that the cow1e 
villages were generally by far more prosperous than most of the other 
villages of the estate, and protested that instead of lamenting all 
the unearned revenue the British should realize that the villages 
became prosperous only after their grant as cow1e, another argument in 
their favor. Curiously, the very classes which were to be prevented 
from holding land proved to be better land managers than the 
"traditional" agricultural classes. 
The only thing Boyle did not note in his defense of the cowles 
was that historically rights to land had been the reward for service 
to the king, and that politically as well as economically this form of 
remuneration was part of the pre-British political system. Lee 
Warner, in his own cynical fashion, appreciated the political nature 
of the leases. He noted that in 1866 poggucami Tevar had run into 
difficulties, and that he had attempted to put down opposing factions 
"partly by the distribution of heavy largess to all his dependents, 
,,58 partly by many settlements of accounts with the Chetties. 
Leaving aside the fascinating questions about poggucami's 
managership, 59 we can nonetheless recognize the conflict between 
"traditional" modes of political action (however different this 
largess was from royal gifts which came before) and British 
expectations about the functioning of the new agrarian system. And, 
as we have seen in a number of curious respects, this conflict was 
both mediated and accentuated by the role of the legal system, which 
in this case seemed to prevent the British from "rationalizing" (in a 
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Weberian sense) their bureaucratic control even as it maintained, 
however ironically, the "status quo." 
The Government did not give up easily. Between 1873 and 1882, 
the British were able to "recover" 104 villages in Ramnad "forming 
part of the alienations made subsequent to the permanent settlement 
• • • either on the expiry of the leases or by court decree. ,,60 This 
included the fourteen villages of Pa~aiyampatti and Panta1ku~i which 
were recovered under the provisions of the Act of 1876, a direct 
administrative response to the failures of legal cases such as O.S. 
~21 of 1873. This Act provided for the sub-division and separate 
assessment of peshkash on alienated lands within permanently settled 
estates. This was to be used "except when the quit rent paid to the 
estates was greater than the proportionate peshkash which would be 
payable after separation," thus displaying the true magnanimous intent 
of the Government. 61 As for "service" and "religious" grants, the 
Government followed the basic provisions which had been laid down in 
the Inam Settlement: 62 
in cases in which the continuance of the service was found 
necessary the quit-rent was adjusted according to circumstances, 
but in other cases in which the service had been discontinued or 
was unnecessary the i~ams have been resumed. In disposing of 
grants for religious and charitable purposes due consideration 
has been shewn for the feelings of the zemindar's families, and 
they have been resumed only in those cases in which the purposes 
were not daily fulfilled. They have been continued in other 
cases, the quit rent being adjusted according to the nature of 
each case. In cases of unauthorized enjoyment of estate lands, 
the occupants have been either ousted or subjected to payment of 
full assessment. 
And so, little by little, the Court of Wards appeared to be regaining 
"control" of the estate. But in spite of all the recoveries, there 
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remained in 1886 another 323 alienated villages still unrecovered out 
of a total number of 2,168 villages in the whole estate. 63 
The fundamental problem for the British was that the Court of 
Wards could only exercise control when there was a minor zamindar. 
When the report of success in recovering alienations was written in 
1886, three years were left before the minor, Baskara Cetupati, was to 
attain his majority. Lee Warner, who had been instrumental not only 
in pressing forward the "interests" of the estate but in establishing 
a number of other agrarian reforms, anticipated what might happen and 
wrote, in 1874, his assessment of what would be best for the estate: 64 
Among other contingencies which might clear the path of reform 
(if it is not looking too far forward) it is just possible that 
the successor to the estate becoming as he grows up convinced of 
the hereditary inaptitude of his family for administration, may 
desire to leave his estate under management and become a 
pensioner of Government. Such an alienation would be valid if 
the recent judgement in the Madura Civil Court is to be relied 
upon, and with regard to all that I know of the life of the late 
Zeminar (who was considered to a 'gentle man among Maravars') and 
the antecedents of his family and ruin of this country, I cannot 
conceive a juster proposition for the Government to entertain; 
for I regard it as the remotest contingency of all, that the 
present boy when he succeeds to rule his estate will have the 
firmness or grasp of mind to reason out that his own happiness is 
intimately bound up with the welfare and prosperity of his 
tenants; and his first act after ascension to power, as 
Sethoopathy, would be to cancel this work, and deluge the 
villages again with dependents and officials of all sorts. All 
the family traditions and Zennanah training point this way. 
The acceptance of Lee Warner's proposal would be tantamount to 
dismantling the Permanent Settlement, leaving only a pensioned king to 
live a life devoid of any real power, let alone his former proprietary 
rights. But Lee Warner did, nonetheless, give expression to the 
fundamental cleavage between the old political system and the new, and 
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realized more perspicaciously than many -- whatever his reasons for so 
doing -- that the attempted synthesis of the Permanent Settlement had 
been a failure. The reasons for its failure were in part the reasons 
why Lee Warner's advice fell on deaf ears; the old cultural system, 
however truncated, did live on, under the guise of the protection of 
the "native aristocracy" and the "status quo." And the British were 
most reluctant, particularly after their experiences in the north in 
1857, to give the impression that they were undermining the authority 
and position of this local elite, however unsuccessful they were in 
attaining their goals of agrarian reform. 
While there was no mutiny in the south, the desire of the 
British to maintain order was not totally fulfilled. We have seen 
that in the old political system the "gift" was basic to the 
constitution of the political order, and thus it should not be 
surprising that the efforts of the British to put a freeze on 
alienation and to resume as much alienated land as possible led to 
some local resistance. Even in the case of the Ramnad cowledars there 
was some trouble; the resistance, however, was more threatened than 
activated, and the major problem seems to have been the undermining of 
the local authority of the cowledars and a consequent resistance on 
the part of their tenants to pay their dues.65 Perhaps predictably 
enough, the major incidence of violence after 1803 came in cases where 
the local "militia" was threatened with the cancellation of their 
landholding privileges by the Inam Settlement. The most conspicuous 
example of this occurred in Putukkottai in 1854, well before the 
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actual Settlement but not before fears of such an eventuation took 
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firm hold. And while we do not come close to seeing the violent 
resistance of the "poligar wars," it might not be inappropriate to 
view the events of 1854 as the last phase of those encounters, an 
agrarian revolt more tied to the disappearance of the old order than 
to the introduction of new forms of agrarian oppression, however 
salient those forms might already have been. 
Law and the Colonial State 
While the attempts of the British to deal with the 
contradictions of colonial rule appear on one level as bumbling, on 
another level we must admire the British for effectively controlling 
the problem of order. As we have just seen, the British were, for all 
their foibles, remarkably successful in stemming disorder and 
presenting themselves as the salvation of the old regime at the very 
same time they were busy dismantling it. This capacity to manage the 
contradictory pursuits of revenue and order was matched by the 
successful management of the seeming contradiction of law as an 
autonomous domain. While the "rule of property" was supposedly 
ushered in by the Permanent Settlement, the Raj not only preserved two 
levels of proprietary interest, but also controlled very carefully the 
introduction of a free market economy. Zamintars were propped up and 
merchants were kept out. 
Law provided both an ideological form of legitimation and a 
diffuse institutional means for the control of colonial society. The 
British were only able to "freeze" their reified conception of the old 
regime because the law provided a structural replacement for politics. 
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It is in this sense that law courts provided the new battlefields for 
the Rajas of old, where titles to kingdoms could be won and lost. 
Gifts could be given, or rather allowed after the fact to have legal 
validity, if they were given for reasons deemed satisfactory in 
British courts of law; which proposed new taxonomies of gifts and new 
notions of political expediency for the construction of what would, 
and what would not, be legitimate zamindari activity. At the same 
time, the law did not penetrate the full range of political relations 
which united superstructure and infrastructure in the old regime. 
Gifts of land might payoff political debts, but they no longer 
provided the forms and mechanisms for relations of service, loyalty, 
and honor. Even as the new British law courts absorbed and 
appropriated only a small fraction of disputes within Indian society, 
British attempts to create new forms of property and new meanings for 
local politics were only partially, and differentially, successful.66 
Political actors became increasingly alienated from the actions they 
engaged in, even as the "tenants" under these actors became alienated 
from the full configuration of social and political relations without 
being given full rights (let alone the economic means) to engage in an 
altogether new political economy. 
The real irony was that the partial autonomy of law, far from 
indicating the loftiness of British ideals and the altruistic 
implantation of liberal institutions, succeeded in rationalizing and 
legitimating the colonial system. For example, we can realize why the 
pacification of the old rural elite by policy and intervention was 
done in conjunction with the enforcement of tenancy rights. 
Legislation regarding the latter actually represented an attempt to 
appropriate the domain of landlord tenant relations and the 
possibilities for the growth of either anti-imperial feeling or 
incipient class consciousness into the diffusionary arena of British 
law. In this way, law had a far more important political than 
economic effect. 
Some of these points have been made in a recent important 
article by David Washbrook.67 Washbrook forcefully examined the 
discrepancy between the theory and practice of law to demonstrate that 
in fact the law was not used to facilitate the introduction of 
capitalist relations into agrarian society. In criticizing the notion 
of the autonomy of law, however, Washbrook let the law drop 
(increasingly as his article proceeds) from his consideration of 
colonial practice. I contend that law, while not totally autonomous, 
was not simply a reflex or arm of the state. Rather, law worked both 
ideologically and institutionally to permit the continuance of 
contradictions in colonial governance.68 Law courts provided an arena 
for political dispute which was as all consuming for some of its 
litigants as it was non-threatening to the state. Old concerns 
continued, but these concerns were deflected and displaced by the 
appropriation of the political position of the zamindars, and had now 
to be argued in the language of the colonizers. 
Law worked powerfully at the level of discourse. Situated as 
it was at the very highest level of cultural production and hegemonic 
influence,69 law provided a set of discursive structures which, 
because of their real implications for the lives of the descendents of 
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old elites, put all other discourse -- about both property and 
sovereignty itself -- in relation to itself. The little kings, while 
they continued old forms of sovereignty by giving gifts, had to 
justify these alienations in terms not of the language of old -- where 
honor, protection, loyalty, kinship, service, property, and privilege 
had specific relational and operational meanings -- but in new terms 
of legal argument and adjudication. Succession disputes privileged 
new forms of conquest and legitimation, where the ability to influence 
a judge became more important than the capacity to mobilize the 
support and loyalty of one's military nobles and retainers. Disputes 
over alienation were now couched in the language of the zamindar's 
"life-interest" in his estate, in arbitrarily conceived and imposed 
statutes of limitation, and in taxonomies of alienation which 
specified "service" in quasi- bureaucratic language. These taxonomies 
not only separated "personal" from "public" service, but even set off 
"religious" from "non-religious" grants, in total violation of old 
regime meanings. The law was based on this kind of spurious 
translation, and operated not only in British terms, but, at least at 
the highest levels, in the English language. The partial autonomy of 
law in the structure of British colonialism made the discourse of the 
law all the more significant. The law appeared to be all powerful, 
even when it wasn't, and it was often the case that the zamindar saw 
himself as having locus standi only in the British courts of law, 
which appeared to mediate all the relations between landlords and 
state. 
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Washbrook's deconstruction of the rhetorical position of law 
within the new colonial state thus neglects the importance of rhetoric 
not only for most British administrators but also for the subjects of 
the colonial realm. Further, Washbrook's criticisms figure as part of 
his general assertion that the Company merely continued lithe revenue 
system and institutions of economic management ll70 which had been part 
and parcel of the old regime. Washbrook is wrong here because he does 
not properly represent the old regime in the Tamil country, and 
mistakes certain transitional episodes in key commercial heartlands 
for the total pre-British past. He ignores the fact that the pre-
British state in the Tamil country was not based principally on 
revenue, and that the freezing of traditional political relations and 
activities profoundly altered the nature of institutions we might 
presume to have been inherited from the old regime. 
The colonial state was not simply a continuation of 
precolonial states, but represented something new and different from 
what had come before. In suggesting this, there is no need to adopt 
the assumptions of modernization theory, in which a static traditional 
world crumbled under the onslaught of the modern West. I am as 
concerned as Washbrook to pinpoint the proper nexus between past and 
present and to lIunderstand its specificities in terms of the dynamics 
of a process of historical change.,,71 But these specificities include 
the cultural weight of gift giving in the precolonial situation, and 
the ways in which these cultural forms provided as much resistance to 
a free market political economy as the very contradictions of 
colonialism itself. As asserted above, what becomes particularly 
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arresting in our examination of British colonialism in south India is 
that the law was used to perpetuate the lag time of culture, so that 
gifts of land continued to be given long after the pre-British 
political system has been effectively truncated and undermined. 
A market economy was not ushered in overnight, but we cannot 
be satisfied with Washbrook's reductionist explanation pointing us to 
the "contradictions in the relations and imperatives of capital.,,72 
Washbrook attempts to rehabilitate Marxist discourse about colonial 
processes in India by noting that Marx was wrong to suggest that the 
colonial state was a necessary evil, a way of hurrying the historical 
transformation from feudalism to capitalism. The most useful part of 
his analysis comes when he demonstrates, by documenting the 
conservative use of law by the British, why and how the colonial state 
never favored the development of the kind of capitalism Marx assumed 
it would, one which for all the social unrest it might have brought 
with would also have been more profitable to the interests of capital. 
But he still perpetuates many of the same mistakes of Marx' own 
Orientalist historiography, in assuming that British policy, whether 
fully or contradictorily capitalistic, was the only game that counts 
(or, perhaps more accurately, set the rules of the only game). 
Washbrook does not bring the Raj into "the same social field as its 
subjects" in the way he purports to do.,,73 
The study of colonial law is thus not only important, but still 
incompletely undertaken. We can assume neither that the law was a 
simple and unmediated reflex of the colonial state nor that it was 
immediately constitutive of the total domain of political culture. 
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However, I do not mean to suggest here the other extreme, that the 
operation of the law in India provides yet another curious example of 
mere bumbling on the part of the Raj, however much genuine bumbling 
did in fact take place. Rather, the introduction and operation of the 
law reveals how the British attempted to regulate, rationalize, and 
legitimize their rule while at the same time they were unable to 
conquer and subdue India in the total sense assumed both by Marx and, 
although in a reformulated sense, many who would use his name to 
legitimize their own historical enterprise. I do not know whether 
Marx would sanction my own attempt to understand the political economy 
of colonialism in terms of the accumulated weight of pre-British 
structures and meanings and by examining the operation of the 
institutions of the colonial state in light of their epistemic and 
political realization. But while I share with those I criticize here 
a continuing admiration for the penetrating analytic insights of Marx' 
theorizing on these matters (both specific and general), I suspect 
that the test for our modern approaches lies somewhere other than in 
Highgate. 
FOOTNOTES 
* I am grateful to Burton Stein for his comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
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1. By moral economy, I do not mean exactly what has been proposed by 
James Scott in his The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1976). In addition, to say that a moral 
economy is more moral than a political economy, even while 
accepting these two characterizations as heuristically useful, is 
to enter into a particular mode of argumentation which I would 
rather avoid. By using the term moral economy, however, I do 
mean to ally myself, however vaguely, with the same substantivist 
literature used by Scott, in particular Polanyi, at least to the 
minimal point of viewing the economy in precapitalist societies 
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